校长问责制构建的经济分析:一种博弈论的视角  

Principal Accountability's Construction:An Analysis from The Angle of Game Theory

作　　者：黄彬[1] 

机构地区：[1]东莞理工学院高教研究与评估中心,东莞523808

出　　处：《教育发展研究》2013年第6期75-79,共5页Research in Educational Development

摘　　要：校长问责制构建的逻辑基点是教育行政部门和校长之间存在的委托代理关系。本文从如何对校长权力进行激励和约束出发,构建了信息对称条件下和信息不对称条件下校长问责制度的委托代理博弈模型,论证校长问责制构建的经济学逻辑。基于此,要改善政府—校长委托代理关系,需要从设计合适的激励机制、减少信息的不对称性和委托代理链的长度、建立校长选拔和任用的"公共选择"机制等方面实施策略行动。Principal-agent relationship between education authority and principals is a logic starting point of constructing principal accountability. To seek ways to stimulate and restrain the power of the principal, in this paper entrust-agency game-model under the circumstance of symmetry and asymmetry information have been discussed. To improve the entrust-agency relationship between education authority and principals, we need to design suitable incentive mechanism, reduce information asymmetry and the principal- agent chain length, and to establish ＂public choice＂ mechanism for selecting and appointing suitable principals.

关 键 词：校长问责制 委托代理关系 博弈 

分 类 号：G40-054[文化科学—教育学原理]