高管激励机制与绩效内生性关系实证研究——以陕西省上市公司数据为例  

Empirical Analysis of Endogenous Relationship Between Executive Incentive Mechanism and Performance——A Case Study of the Listed Companies of Shaanxi Province

作　　者：侯剑平[1] 庞媛[1] 介迎疆[1] 卜文辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安工业大学经济管理学院,西安710021

出　　处：《西安工业大学学报》2013年第1期30-37,45,共9页Journal of Xi’an Technological University

基　　金：陕西省教育厅科研基金(12JK0131)

摘　　要：随着"委托-代理"的公司经营模式兴起,关于高管激励机制与绩效之间相关关系的研究应运而生.文中在单一方程模型与联立方程模型基础上,运用Eviews软件对陕西省上市公司的数据进行处理,并采用经济附加值(Economic Value Added,EVA)作为衡量企业经营绩效的指标,从内生性的视角研究上市公司高管激励机制与绩效之间的关系.结果表明高管激励机制与绩效之间不但存在着正相关关系,而且两者之间存在内生性关系.而对于两者的相互作用机理方面还需要进一步研究.The research on the relationship between executive incentives and performance has been emerging with the development of the ＂principal-Agent＂ basiness model. Based on the establishment of the single equation model and simultaneous equation model, the data of list companies in Shaanxi Province were proeessed by using Eviews software. And with the economic value added （EVA） as the measurement for the companny performance, the relationship between executive incentive mechanism and performance was stu,：lied from the endogenous perspective. The results shows that there are not only a positive correlation but also an endogenous relationship between executive incentives and pereformance. But Their interaetior mechanism requires further study.

关 键 词：上市公司 激励机制 绩效 EVA 内生性 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F272.92F832.51