家族企业、控股股东与股权激励——以自利性假说和道德风险假说为基础  

Family Enterprise,Controlling Shareholders and Equity Incentive Plan——Based on Self-interesting Hypothesis and Moral Risk Hypothesis

作　　者：巩娜[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计学院会计与财务学院,上海201620

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2013年第5期94-102,共9页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"股权激励契约结构;管理层决策与公司价值"(71102013);国家自然科学基金项目"我国企业集团内部资本市场的形成机制和经济后果研究"(71172017);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(09YJA630099);上海市教委创新项目<后金融危机时代我国上市公司股权激励行为分析>(12YS156);上海高校选拔培养优秀青年教师科研专项基金<制度变迁;会计信息质量与股权激励计划关系研究>(slx10003)

摘　　要：以2005～2011年公布股权激励计划的152家家族企业上市公司为样本进行研究,根据管理层自利性假说和道德风险假说分析我国家族企业控股股东持股比例对股权激励计划定位与效果的影响。实证结果表明,家族企业上市公司控股股东为了避免管理层可能出现的道德风险而实施股权激励,但控股股东持股比例会影响股权激励给予的股权数量;家族内部的股权结构会影响实际控股股东对股权激励计划的影响,控股股东也会影响股权激励实施的后果。According to the management self-interesting hypothesis and moral risk hypothesis,this paper analyzes the effect of Chinese family enterprise company shareholders on the positioning and economic consequence of equity incentive plan based on the sample of 152 family enterprises listed companies which issued equity incentive plan during 2005-2011.The empirical results show that the controlling shareholders of family enterprise listed companies will implement equity incentive in order to avoid possible management moral risk.But shareholder＇s holding will affect the number of equity in equity incentive plan.And the ownership structure within the family will affect the influence of actual controlling shareholders on the equity incentive plan.And the controlling shareholders can also affect the implementation consequences of the equity incentive.

关 键 词：家族企业 控股股东股权激励 定位与效果 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]