意义实体的现象学建构——胡塞尔《逻辑研究》中的意义理论  

The Phenomenological Constitution of the Entity of Meaning: Husserl s Theory of Meaning in Logical Investigations

作　　者：朱耀平[1] 

机构地区：[1]苏州大学政治与公共管理学院,江苏苏州215123

出　　处：《中国石油大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第2期74-79,共6页Journal of China University of Petroleum (Edition of Social Sciences)

基　　金：江苏省社会科学基金项目(12ZXB009)

摘　　要：胡塞尔与弗雷格一样都是逻辑主义意义理论的主要代表人物。胡塞尔虽然并不赞同弗雷格认为意义或思想存在于某个"第三种领域"中的说法,但在意义或思想是既不同于客观事物也不同于主观表象的"第三种实体"这一点上,他与弗雷格是完全一致的。在《逻辑研究》中,通过对意义与表象、意义与指称、意义与对意义的体验等问题上存在的模糊和混乱之处的澄清,胡塞尔对意义的客观性和不变性进行了详细的论证,从而将"意义实体"作为一个重要的哲学概念确立了起来。Both Husserl and Frege are the major representative figures of the theory of meaning. Though Husserl doesn＇t agree with Frege on the point that the meaning or thought exists in ＇ the third area＇ , he is consistent with the later on that the meaning is ＇ the third entity＇ which is different with both the objective things and the subjective consciousness. In his Logical Investigations, Husserl tried to demonstrate the objectivity and identity of meaning through the elimination of some vagueness and confusions on the problem of relationship between expression and its＇ meaning. In this process, ＇the entity of meaning＇ was established as an important concept of philosophy.

关 键 词：胡塞尔 弗雷格 表达 意义实体 语言哲学 现象学 

分 类 号：B505[哲学宗教—外国哲学]