考虑社会偏好信息的横向监督与员工组合研究  

The Study on Horizontal Monitoring and Employee Grouping with the Social Preference Information

作　　者：王艳梅[1] 赵希男[1] 刘炳东[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳110004 [2]鞍山钢铁集团公司,辽宁鞍山114000

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2013年第3期341-348,共8页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71202154);中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(20100481194);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(N100406009;N120406006)

摘　　要：考虑存在横向监督时员工组合的两种方式:根据社会偏好信息进行同质组合或异质组合。运用委托代理理论,研究最大化横向监督激励效应的最佳员工组合方式。模型分别给出了不存在横向监督、存在横向监督且员工是同质组合、存在横向监督且员工是异质组合3种情形下的均衡结果。根据均衡结果做进一步分析,得出:①存在横向监督时员工的努力程度与企业收益总是高于不存在横向监督的情形,但企业的激励强度始终不变;②存在横向监督时员工组合方式并不对员工的努力程度产生影响,但是,高社会偏好者的努力程度总是高于低社会偏好者;③当员工是异质组合时,由于社会效用的存在而导致企业成本的节约高于同质组合的情形,从而使得企业能够获得更多的收益,因此,企业最佳的员工组合方式是根据员工的社会偏好信息将其进行异质组合。There are two kinds of mixes of employees, grouping employees with different social preference and grouping employees with similar social preference. Based on principal--agent theory, the optimal choice of grouping employees considering social preference information is studied. The model presents the equilibrium outcomes in different conditions. The analysis shows that, the employees＇ effort and firm＇s income are higher than those without peer monitoring; when there is peer monitoring, mix of employees does not affect the employees＇ effort, while the employees＇ effort with higher social preference is always higher than those with lower social preference; when the employees with different social preference are grouped, the social utility cost savings is more than that when the employees of similar social preference are grouped, and the firm can get more revenue. To conclude, the firm should group the employees with different social preference.

关 键 词：横向监督 道德风险 员工组合 激励效应 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]