基于发包方参与的软件服务外包委托-代理关系分析  

Principal-agent Analysis of Software Service Outsourcing Based on Contract-issuing Party Participation

作　　者：李晓青[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门理工学院,福建厦门361024

出　　处：《软科学》2013年第6期135-139,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：福建省教育厅社会科学研究项目(JA12284S)

摘　　要：针对不对称信息下软件服务外包中的道德风险问题,建立发包方参与的委托代理模型,求解发包方参与水平、报酬激励系数和承包方努力水平最优解,进一步剖析发包方参与成本系数、承包方能力系数、努力成本系数、风险规避程度、外生随机变量影响系数和不确定性对这三个变量的影响,同时考察了三者之间的逻辑关系,设计与发包方参与相匹配的报酬激励机制,为发包方在软件服务外包中的参与决策和激励机制设计提供理论支持。This paper, according to the moral hazard problem due to the asymmetric information in software service outsourcing, establishes principal-agent model with contract-issuing party participation, solves the optimal solutions of the contractissuing party participation degree, reward incentive coefficient and the contractor effect, and further analyzes the impact of contract-issuing party participation cost coefficient, the contractor ability coefficient , effort cost coefficient, the degree of risk aversion, exogenous stochastic variable influence coefficient and uncertainty on the three variables, whose logical rela- tionships are explored at the same time in the study. It put forward the incentive mechanism which matches contract-issuing party participation degree and provides a theoretical support for contract-issuing party participation decision making and incentive mechanism design.

关 键 词：软件服务外包 委托-代理关系 道德风险 发包方参与 激励机制 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]