R&D溢出、谈判能力与企业技术获取  

R&D Spillovers,Bargaining Power and Firm Technology Acquisition

作　　者：李卫红[1,2] 白杨[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京210016 [2]南京审计学院信息科学学院,江苏南京210029

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2013年第12期99-103,共5页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：江苏省高校自然科学研究项目"江苏制造业和物流业联动发展的体系创新及模型优化研究"(10KJD120001);教育部人文社科规划课题"环境规制下企业‘创新补偿’效应的生成与演化机理"(13YJAZH045)

摘　　要：考虑R&D溢出、企业谈判能力的影响,将企业独立研发、合作研发和技术引进统一到一个两阶段R&D/产品模型下进行考察,分析企业选择不同技术获取方式的条件及其对社会福利的影响。研究发现,当技术溢出水平较低时,具有一定谈判能力的企业存在技术引进动机;当技术溢出水平较高时,企业会选择合作研发进行创新,与谈判能力无关。当企业选择技术引进时,产量提成模式下的社会福利水平高于固定费用模式,但低于独立研发时的社会福利水平,并且与企业谈判能力负相关。With the influence of R＆D spillovers and firm＇ s bargaining power, three innovation modes, independent R＆D, cooperative R＆D and technology licensing are investigated in a two - stage R＆D/production model, and the conditions of firm choosing different technology acquisition mode and the effect on social welfare are analyzed. The results show that the firm with bargaining power has motivation for technology licensing under low technology spillovers and chooses cooperative R＆D under higher technology spillovers. When the firm chooses technology licensing, the social welfare in the mode of royalty is higher than the level of fixed - fee mode, but lower than the level of independent R＆D, which is negatively correlated with firm＇ s bargaining power.

关 键 词：技术创新 研发溢出 谈判能力 技术获取 博弈论 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]