不完全测度下多目标IT外包关系契约激励机制  

Relational incentive contracts for multiobjective IT outsourcing with incomplete measurement

作　　者：张宗明[1] 刘树林[1] 廖貅武[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,过程控制与效率工程教育部重点实验室,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2013年第3期338-347,共10页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70890081)

摘　　要：针对IT外包的多目标、多任务和不完全测度的特点,运用委托代理理论设计了关系激励契约,刻画了折现系数和任务特性对关系契约使用条件的影响.研究表明,随折现系数的增加,关系契约的使用临界值降低、适用区间增大、激励效果增加;当任务关系为替代关系时,关系契约的使用临界值随IT成本降低努力成本系数的提高而降低,随IT服务质量提升努力成本系数的提高而提高,随IT服务质量相对重要性的提高而降低,随替代性程度的提高而提高;当任务关系为互补关系时,关系契约的使用临界值仅与IT服务质量提升努力的成本系数和IT服务质量的相对重要性有关.Considering the characteristics of multiobjective, multitask and incomplete measurement of IT outsourcing, a relational outsourcing contract is designed based on principal-agent theory. Moreover, the impacts of the discount rate and the task characteristics on the threshold of the relational contract are analyzed. The resuits indicate that the threshold of relational contract decreases with the discount rate, and the applicable range and incentive effect of relational contract increases with the discount rate. When the efforts toward reducing costs and the efforts toward improving quality are substitutes, the threshold of relational contract decreases with the cost parameters of reducing IT costs, increases with the cost parameters of improving IT service quality, decreases with the relative importance of IT service quality, and increases with the degree of substitution of the two activities. However, when reducing cost and improving quality are complements, the threshold of relational contract is merely influenced by the cost parameters and the relative importance of improving IT service quality.

关 键 词：IT外包 多任务 不完全测度 委托代理理论 关系契约 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]