我国金融业上市公司高级管理人员薪酬和公司业绩分析  

Analysis on the Pay and Company Performance of the Senior Managers of Listed Companies of China’s Financial Industry

作　　者：王立刚 

机构地区：[1]中铁十三局办公室,吉林长春130031

出　　处：《长春金融高等专科学校学报》2013年第2期35-38,共4页Journal of Changchun Finance College

摘　　要：委托代理理论提出了金融业高级管理人员薪酬与公司业绩相关性的假设。我国上市的多家金融业公司高级管理人员薪酬与公司业绩的相关性较差,高级管理人员薪酬的激励制度并没有与绩效挂钩。研究我国金融业上市公司高级管理人员薪酬制度的现状并提出相关的对策建议,具有重要意义。Principal-agent theory put forward the correlation hypothesis of financial industry senior management pay and corporate performance.Our listed finance companies senior managers and firm performance is poorer,the relevance of the senior managers compensation incentive system is not linked to performance.It has important significance that do research on the status of our country listed company senior management personnel salary system and put forward the relevant countermeasures and suggestions.

关 键 词：金融业 上市 高级管理人员 薪酬 业绩分析 

分 类 号：F272.923[经济管理—企业管理]