海德格尔《存在与时间》中的死亡现象学问题  

Heidegger's Phenomenology of Death Question in Being and Time

作　　者：纪锡垕[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南民族大学政治学院,成都610041

出　　处：《宜宾学院学报》2013年第5期18-24,38,共8页Journal of Yibin University

基　　金：西南民族大学中央高校专项资金项目(12ZYXS17)

摘　　要：向死而在是海德格尔死亡的现象学考察的核心问题。在死之悬临之中所显现的是生,而此种生的前提是现象学意义上的死,是入死出生,是在打断过去、现在、未来的时间维度而敞开的第四维的时间性的生。向死而在的生是无人称的,是余在,是Dasein的进一步改写。向死而在的余生召唤着第四维生命的打开,余生的保持就是进入第四维。余在是第四维生命的存在,是新的时间,是余化的生命存在,这是余在对海德格尔死亡的现象学问题重构。The concept of ＇ Being toward Death＇ is one of the pivotal elaborations in Heidegger＇ s phenomenology of Death. In the suspension of death there is a revealation. However, the precondition of such life is based exactly on the phenomenology of Death, which preludes the possibility of life, breaks three dimensions of the time, namely the past, now, and future, and opens the fourth dimension of time concerning Being. ＇ Being toward Death＇ in life is impersonal. This is the Reste-Being, a rewriting of Dasein. The Reste-life of ＇ Being towards Death＇ calls for an opening of the fourth dimension of life. Keeping the Reste-life means entering the fourth dimension. Reste-Being is the fourth dimension of Being. This is a new time and the being of reste-life. It is Reste-Being that is reconstructing heidegger＇ s phenomenology of death.

关 键 词：DASEIN 向死先行 本真 第四维时间 余生—余在 

分 类 号：B516.54[哲学宗教—外国哲学]