高管薪酬激励是否应兼顾分配公平?  

Should Executive Compensation Incentives Consider Distribution Fairness?

作　　者：覃予[1] 傅元略[2] 杨隽萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学经济管理学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]厦门大学会计研究发展中心,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《财经研究》2013年第8期110-121,共12页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(70872096);教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(11YJC630253);浙江理工大学科研启动基金(1005823-Y)的资助

摘　　要：薪酬激励的效率与公平问题一直广受关注。文章实证研究了公平分配对中国上市公司业绩及高管薪酬激励效率的影响。研究发现:(1)虽然高管薪酬激励能够促进企业业绩增长,但是企业薪酬差距过大(产生正向不公平)会阻滞企业业绩提升,降低高管薪酬激励效率。而且,宏观经济从上升期转向回落期会引发企业员工对薪酬正向不公平更加敏感,从而使正向不公平对企业业绩的阻滞作用增强,对高管薪酬激励效率的减弱作用更加明显,这突出体现在更为偏好公平的国有企业中。(2)薪酬差距过小(产生负向不公平)则有助于提升企业业绩,而且不受宏观经济波动和企业公平偏好强度的影响。The effectiveness and fairness of executive compensation is always of great concern. This paper empirically studies the effects of distri- bution fairness on firm performance and executive compensation incentives. It reaches the conclusions as follows： firstly, although executive compensa- tion incentives can promote the increase in firm performance, the excessive great gap of firm compensation which gives rise to positive unfairness will in- hibit the rise in firm performance and weaken the effects of executive com- pensation incentives; the change of macro economy from upward period to downward period results in a more heightened sensitivity of employees to positive compensation unfairness, thereby further strengthening the inhibi- tion role of positive unfairness in firm performance and playing a more obvi- ous role in the decrease in the effects of executive compensation incentives, especially in state-owned enterprises with stronger fairness preference; se- condly, the excessive small gap of firm compensation which results in nega- tive unfairness is beneficial to the increase in firm performance and does not change in econonic environment and fairness preference of firms.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 薪酬不公平 企业业绩 经济波动 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]