企业承诺、消费者选择与产品质量水平的均衡分析  

Commitment,Consumer Choice and Product Quality Level:An Equilibrium Analysis Based on Corporate Social Responsibility

作　　者：王夏阳[1] 傅科[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院,邮政编码510275

出　　处：《经济研究》2013年第8期94-106,共13页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71102101;71072087;71072090);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC630251)资助

摘　　要：本文以企业社会责任为切入点,在离散选择与理性预期均衡的框架下,研究企业承担社会责任对生产商质量水平投入决策的影响机理与演化路径,探讨企业承诺与消费者选择、生产商的质量投入水平决策的关系。本文的研究表明:当缺乏最基本的价格一致性承诺与表现为质量一致性承诺的企业社会责任约束时,消费者理性选择的结果会导致生产商的质量投入水平较低;当生产商能够保持价格一致性承诺时,产品的质量水平会得到有限的改善;当生产商同时保持价格和质量一致性承诺时,消费者的选择行为会促使市场达到质价相符、质量水平提升的均衡状态。本文还结合我国食品、药品等行业面临的实际情况,分析不同类型的质量保证机制的差异。研究表明,虽然企业主动承诺是更优的质量保证机制,但是在失信行为普遍的情形下,引入严厉的质量监督机制必不可少。We study the impact of corporate social responsibility on a producer＇s quality investment decision and its evolution path by employing a discrete choice and rational expectations equilibrium framework. We analyze the relationship among commitment, consumer choice and producer＇s quality investment decision. We show that without the basic price-consistency commitment and the corporate social responslbihty constraint defined as quality-eonsistency commitment, a consumer＇s rational consumption choice will lead to a low quality level. The quality level will be improved only limitedly when the producer keeps the price-consistency commitment whereas with both price- and quality-consistency commitment the consumer＇s choice behavior will drive the market to achieve an equilibrium of quality-price-consistency and the quality will be improved to be sufficiently high. We also discuss the different mechanisms of quality guarantee regarding the real practice of food and pharmaceutical industry in China. We show that although a company＇s self-commitment will be a better choice for quality guarantee, the government may still need to have strict quality regulations when non-commitment prevails.

关 键 词：企业承诺 消费者选择 质量 理性预期均衡 企业社会责任 

分 类 号：F272-05[经济管理—企业管理] F273.2[经济管理—国民经济]