基于核心解的运输联盟的成本分摊  

Cost Allocation of Transportation Alliance Based on Core Solution

作　　者：郑士源[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学交通运输学院,上海201306

出　　处：《系统工程》2013年第8期47-53,共7页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272219);国家社会科学基金青年项目(11CGL 077);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(10YJC630412)

摘　　要：以运输合作博弈模型为基础,讨论了运输合作博弈核心解的定义和寻找核心解的通用算法。针对核心解可能不唯一的缺陷,分析了两类特殊的核心解——对偶分配解和逆向优化解的定义和算法。通过理论证明指出运输合作博弈的对偶分配解和逆向优化解完全一致,均属于核心解,此时由所有承运人组成的总联盟是最稳定的。此外,通过案例分析还发现两者具有一定的"外部性",即某个承运人的产量增加会降低联盟其它成员的成本份额,而他自己的成本份额却有可能上升;而由于某个承运人的需求量增加会增加该承运人的成本份额,其他承运人的成本份额不变。This paper discusses the definition and general algorithm of core solution based on the transportation cooperative game model. As core solutions are not unique, two special core solutions, Dual Alloeation Solution （DAS） and Inverse Optimization Solution （IOS）, are defined and their algorithms are discussed. Theoretical proof shows that DAS and lOS are the same, and they belong to the core solutions, which means that the grand eoalition of all carriers are the most stable coalition. Moreover, case studies find that DAS and IOS have the property of ＂externality＂, which means that increase in a carrier＇s production volume will decrease others＇ cost allocations while increasing his owns. The increase of a carrier＇s demand will increase his cost allocations while others keep unchanged.

关 键 词：运输联盟 合作博弈 核心解 对偶问题 逆向优化 

分 类 号：U491[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]