屠宰加工企业与政府监管行为选择的博弈分析——以优质猪肉供应链为例  

A Game Analysis of the Behavior Choice between Slaughter and Processing Enterprises and Government Regulation——Taking High Quality Pork Supply Chain as an Example

作　　者：夏兆敏[1] 王晓辉[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学工商管理学院,山东济南250014 [2]山东财经大学管理科学与工程学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《山东财政学院学报》2013年第5期95-100,共6页Journal of Shandong Finance Institute

基　　金：山东省软科学研究计划项目"山东省低碳排放产业体系与消费模式的构建与对策研究"(2012RKB01384)

摘　　要：应用静态博弈和混合策略博弈模型,研究了优质猪肉供应链中屠宰加工企业和政府监管之间的行为决策过程,并据此提出了对策建议。研究表明,在政企完全信息静态博弈模型中,策略(不检查,优质猪肉产品)是符合政企双方可持续发展要求的最好的均衡结果。从长远角度看,增加屠宰加工企业优质生产净收益和优惠补贴,加大对屠宰加工企业违规行为的罚金和信用损失,减少违规屠宰加工企业的超额收益,减少政府监督成本,都会促使政企双方做出最优策略的选择。This paper applied a static game and mixed strategy game model, studied the behavior decision-making process between slaughter and processing enterprises in high quality pork supply chain and government supervision, and put forward countermeasures and suggestions. The study shows that in the complete information static game model, the strategy （do not check, high quality pork products）, which conforms to the requirements of sustainable development, is the best equilibrium of the game. In the long run, to increase the net income of high quality products and preferential subsidies of the enterprises, increase enterprises＇ fake fines and credit losses, reduce counterfeiting excess returns, reduce government supervision cost can prompt government and enterprises to make the optimal strategy.

关 键 词：优质猪肉供应链 屠宰加工企业 政府 行为选择 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]