企业竞合行为的演化博弈分析——以我国创意产业为例  

Analysis on Cooperation and Competition Behavior of Enterprises based on Evolutionary Game——The Case Studies of Chinese Creative Industrial Clusters

作　　者：李建设[1] 闫乐薇[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津理工大学管理学院,天津300384

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2013年第10期106-110,共5页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

摘　　要：近年来,创意产业不仅成为学界关注的热点,也成为政府和企业专注与投资的特点。企业之间竞合行为将直接决定其竞争力,进而影响我国创意产业竞争力与发展方向。本文基于文化创意产业集群内企业间的竞合行为,运用演化博弈的理论方法,建立了核心企业之间的横向对称博弈及核心企业与其相邻下游企业之间的纵向非对称博弈的数理模型,分析了其演变的动态过程。研究结果表明,该系统的演化方向与双方博弈的支付矩阵相关,博弈结果受到合作收益、初始合作成本、独立创新能力、合作成功率、以及双方初始状态等因素的影响,最后给出了相关建议,为整合我国文化产业集群提供了理论依据。In recent years, not only the academics pays close attention to the creative industries, but also enterprises and the government keep a watchful eye on it. Cooperation and competition behaviors of enterprises will decide their competitiveness direct- ly, thereby affecting the competitiveness and future direction of our creative industries. In this paper, based on cooperation and competition behavior in creative industrial clusters, we establish symmetric game model between two core enterprises and asym- metric game model between the core enterprise and the adjacent down-stream one by using evolutionary game theory, then anal- yse its dynamic evolutionary procedure. The result show that the system＇s evolutionary direction is closely related to players＂ pay- off, and influenced by cooperation profit, initial cost of the cooperation, capacity for independent innovation, cooperation suc- cessful rate and system＇s initial status. At last, some suggestions are offered for our government which can provide a theoretical ba- sis for integrating creative industrial clusters.

关 键 词：竞合行为 演化稳定 演化博弈 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]