基于垄断行业上市公司的高管权力、薪酬与公司绩效相关性研究  

Correlation Research on Executive Power,Compensation and Corporate Performance Based on Listed Companies in Monopoly Industry

作　　者：杨洪波[1] 陈映赫[1] 李绍萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北石油大学石油经济与管理研究所,黑龙江大庆163318

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第5期12-19,42,共9页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(12BJY076);黑龙江省教育科学"十二五"规划课题基金项目(GBC1211034)

摘　　要：采用多元线性回归的方法,分析了垄断行业上市公司高管权力、薪酬与公司绩效三者之间的相关性。研究结果表明:垄断行业上市公司高管货币薪酬总体上与公司财务绩效指标不相关,而与公司市场绩效指标在滞后一期回归分析中显著正相关;高管持股比例与公司财务绩效、市场绩效指标均不相关;高管人员会利用手中的权力影响自身的薪酬,尤其是隐性薪酬;高管权力与公司绩效无线性相关。It adopts multiple linear regression method and analyzes the correlation of executive power, compensation and corporate performance based on listed companies in monopoly industry. The study shows that the compensation of executives from listed companies in monopoly industry is gener- ally not related with the company＇s financial performance indicators; instead it is significantly positive correlated with company＇s market performance indicators in lag regression analysis. The proportion of executives shares owned is also not related with financial performance and market performance indicators. Top managers will use their power to influence their own compensation, especially recessive compensation. The power of executives is not linearly correlated with company performance,

关 键 词：垄断行业 上市公司 高管权力 高管薪酬 公司绩效 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]