股权投资与企业高管双重激励的实证研究  

An Empirical Study on Equity Investment and Dual Incentive of Corporate Executives

作　　者：李维安[1] 苏启林[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《暨南学报（哲学社会科学版）》2013年第9期44-49,161,共6页Jinan Journal(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金项目<不对称利他;代理冲突与家族企业经理人聘用策略>(批准号:20080430715);广东省自然科学基金项目<创业投资与非珠三角产业创新成长--基于共生模型的研究>(批准号:S2012010008601)

摘　　要：随着我国私募股权投资者投资机构的快速发展,私募股权投资者在改善企业高管激励中发挥着重要的作用。薪酬激励和股权激励是考察股权投资介入对企业高管激励影响的重要维度,实证研究结果表明:国内股权投资机构普遍倾向于采用提高薪酬水平和拉大高管与普通员工之间薪酬差距的方式来实现激励目标,而对于高管股权激励方式则较少使用,并且这种趋势随着股权投资机构的持股比例上升而更为明显。这反映了国内股权投资者更加注重对企业股权的控制,加之公司管理层与投资者之间的信息不对称难以被有效地克服,投资者更不愿意让渡股权对高管层进行激励。With rapid development of private equity investment in China,private equity investors play an important role in improving the incentive of their executives. This paper analyses the influence to executive incentive from the salary incentive and equity incentive dimensions,and does relevant empirical research. We found that domestic equity investment institutions tend to achieve the goal of incentive by improving salary levels and widening salary gaps between executives and ordinary employees,while using less for executive equity incentive mode; this trend with the ownership equity investment institutions increased more obviously.

关 键 词：股权投资 高管激励 薪酬激励 股权激励 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]