基于SCF的多任务委托代理激励机制  

Multi-Task Principal-Agent Incentive Mechanism based on SCF

作　　者：辛玉红[1] 李小莉[1] 

机构地区：[1]五邑大学经济管理学院,广东江门529020

出　　处：《工业工程》2013年第5期39-44,共6页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：广东省自然科学基金资助项目(9452902001003568);广东省江门市哲学社会科学项目(2011C32)

摘　　要：基于供应链金融,结合多任务委托代理模型,研究了制造商对供应商的线性激励。比较分析了不同信息状况下,各影响因素对激励强度、制造商期望收益的影响;讨论了不同信息条件下,供应链金融应收账款融资业务正常运行应达到的最优努力水平。研究发现:当信息对称时,通过设计合理的线性激励合同,制造商可以使供应商实现最优努力水平。当信息不对称时,制造商的期望收益与供应商的努力投入影响程度存在正相关关系,与供应商的成本系数、风险规避度存在负相关关系;且激励份额与供应商的风险规避度存在负相关关系。Based on supply chain finance （SCF）, the linear incentive between supplier and retailer is studied from the perspective of multi-task principal-agency theory. Effects of different parameters on the stimulation intensity and the expected income of the manufacturer are analyzed in different information cir- cumstances. Also, the optimal level of effort at which the receivable business of SCF can run normally un- der different information conditions is discussed. It is found that, with symmetric information, by reasona- ble linear incentive scheme, the manufacturer is able to enable the supplier to reach the optimal level of ef- fort. With asymmetric information, the expected income of manufacturer is proportional to the influence of supplier efforts to it. At the same time, the expected income of manufacturer also has a negative correlation with supplier cost coefficient and risk aversion. In addition, there is a negative correlation with the incen- tive share and supplier risk aversion.

关 键 词：供应链金融 多任务委托代理模型 激励机制 

分 类 号：F270.3[经济管理—企业管理]