经理人自利动机对费用粘性的影响研究  

A Study on the Impact of Managers' Self-interest Incentive to Cost Stickiness

作　　者：李粮[1] 宋振康[1] 

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学会计学院,山西太原030031

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2013年第12期93-103,共11页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部博士点基金资助项目"复杂产品研发过程成本测度研究"(20110032110035);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"国企内部控制;高管权力对并购绩效的影响效应研究"(11YZA630208)

摘　　要：基于心理学和组织行为学理论,本文构造出经理人自利动机的衡量指标,并以我国2001～2012年持续上市的公司为样本,研究经理人自利动机对费用粘性的影响。研究表明,经理人自利动机对费用粘性水平有积极的影响。具体而言,并购重组事件是经理人自利动机付诸实施的前提条件,充足的自由现金流和较长的经理人任期是经理人自利动机实施的必备条件,而经理人薪酬结构中变动性比例的增加会刺激经理人自利动机的实施,这些因素均对费用粘性产生显著的正向影响。The measure of self-interest incentive is constructed based on the theory of psychology and organization behavior. Us- ing China＇s listed company data from 2001 to 2012, this paper studies the impact of managers＇ self-interest incentive to cost sticki- ness. The study finds that managers＇ self-interest incentive has a significant positive impact on cost stickiness. Specifically, merger and acquisition events provide opportunity for managers with self-interest incentive. Sufficient free cash flow and a longer tenure are necessary for managers to achieve their own interests, and less fixed pay in managers＇ compensation would stimulate managers＇ self- incentive.

关 键 词：经理人 自利动机 费用粘性 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]