无赎回权的住房反向抵押贷款逆向选择困境与治理路径选择  

Study on Dilemma of Adverse Selection and Governance Pathway Selection of Reverse Mortgage Loan with No Right of Redemption

作　　者：陈德强[1] 杨田[1] 卢荣荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学建设管理与房地产学院,重庆400045

出　　处：《世界科技研究与发展》2013年第6期794-797,共4页World Sci-Tech R&D

摘　　要：住房反向抵押贷款中存在着严重的信息不完全和信息不对称,借款人往往会利用其身体健康状况信息优势进行逆向选择,从而给该业务的发展带来巨大风险和破坏性作用。文章从博弈的视角对逆向选择困境的形成和不利后果进行了分析,并根据信号传递模型设计出相应的信号机制对上述风险进行防范。结果表明,贷款机构根据借款人的身体健康状况评测报告进行筛选的信号机制,对逆向选择困境的治理效果明显。There are serious risks of information incomplete and asymmetric in housing reverse mortgage loan. The borrowers tend to use their physical health information superiority to adverse select, and thus bring a huge risk and destructive effects to the development of the business. In this paper, the formation and adverse consequence of adverse selection are analyzed from the perspective of the game, trying to guard a- gainst the risks by designing corresponding signal mechanism according to the signaling model. The result shows that the signal mechanism of lending institutions＇ filtering based on the evaluation report of health status of the borrowers has significant treatment effect to the dilemma of adverse selection.

关 键 词：住房反向抵押贷款 逆向选择 信号传递模型 

分 类 号：F293.3[经济管理—国民经济] F832.4F224