内部控制缺陷披露与会计盈余薪酬契约有用性——来自深市主板上市公司的经验证据  

Internal Control Deficiencies Disclosure and the Usefulness of Accounting Earning in Compensation Contract——Empirical Evidences from Listed Firms in Main Board of the Shenzhen

作　　者：洪峰[1] 戴文涛[2] 

机构地区：[1]北方工业大学经济与管理学院,北京100041 [2]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071

出　　处：《兰州商学院学报》2013年第6期98-105,共8页Journal of Lanzhou Commercial College

基　　金：国家社会科学基金"企业内部控制综合评价模型与中国上市公司内部控制质量研究"(12BGL032)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：通过以2011年度披露内部控制自我评价报告的深市主板上市公司为样本,实证检验内部控制缺陷披露对会计盈余薪酬契约有用性的影响。研究发现:相对于未披露内部控制缺陷的公司,披露内控缺陷的公司,会计盈余薪酬契约有用性更低;相对于披露会计层面内部控制缺陷的公司,披露公司层面内控缺陷的公司,会计盈余薪酬契约有用性更低。研究结论表明内部控制缺陷披露有利于提升薪酬契约有效性。This paper examines the influence of internal control deficiencies disclosure on the usefulness of accounting earning in compensation contract using the internal control self- assessment report from Main Board of the Shenzhen Listed Corporation. The results indicate that relative to undisclosed company, the company disclosing internal control deficiencies poses lower usefulness of accounting earning in compen- sation contract. With respect to the disclosure of the accounting level deficiencies, the company disclosed the corporate level internal control deficiencies poses lower usefulness of accounting earning in compensa-tion contract. The research shows that the internal control deficiencies disclosure is conducive to the ef- fectiveness of compensation contract.

关 键 词：内部控制缺陷披露 会计盈余 薪酬契约 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]