现金激励的偏差及有效激励模式的构建  被引量:1

Deviation in cash incentives and effective model establishment in stated-owned enterprises

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作  者:曾威[1] 

机构地区:[1]东北财经大学经济学院,辽宁大连116025

出  处:《辽宁师范大学学报(自然科学版)》2013年第4期473-478,共6页Journal of Liaoning Normal University:Natural Science Edition

基  金:教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地项目(11JJD790052)

摘  要:以现金为主的中长期激励机制可以通过激发员工工作动机提高绩效水平,但囿于国企监管部门多任务激励模式的不对称,现金激励容易出现偏差.针对国企中长期激励机制的研究,在运用委托-代理理论模式下的激励理论分析方法基础上,对国有企业激励可行配置集变化进行分析.认为以现金为主的中长期激励容易导致企业管理层为追求企业短期会计利润而放弃影响国企长远发展和需长期投资才能产生效应的技术和产品研发、技术创新、人力资源改进,提出国企监管部门应建立结果导向型薪酬激励如股权期权计划、长期利润分享等有效激励模式,建立剩余索取权与剩余控制权相对应或匹配的"激励合同",旨在为国企高管的薪酬改革提供理论支撑.Cash incentives on the medium and long term in state-ow ned enterprises can arouse the em-ployee’s motives and improve their performance .Owing to asymmetric incentives model in multitask deputed by state-ow ned asset supervision and administration commission ,cash incentives can arise the deviation .T his paper analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of cash incentives on the medium and long term in state-ow ned enterprises using the theory of incentives on the basis of incentives configu-ration set state-ow ned enterprises at the contemporary time .T he results indicate that cash incentives on the medium and long term in stated-ow ned enterprises can lead to the effect of managerial myopia for the abandon of long term development ,such as innovation in technology and product ,R&D and human resources improvement ,instead of earning the profits on the short time .The purpose and asymmetric task incentives in state-owned enterprises can affect the development of them ,thus we suggest that cash incentives should be halt at present .Meanwhile ,the recommendations are the state-ow ned asset supervision and administration commission should establish Result Oriented Compensa-tion Model ,such as stock plan ,option scheme or long term profit sharing incentives models .The in-centives contracts are best match the residual control rights with residual control rights ,and hopeful-ly it can supply the theoretical base of reform .

关 键 词:现金激励 中长期现金激励 多任务激励 不对称信息 

分 类 号:F270.5[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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