大股东控制、高管薪酬和公司绩效的实证分析——来自中国民营上市公司的证据  

Large Shareholder Control,Executive Compensation and Corporate Performance:Empirical Evidence from the Private Listed Companies in China

作　　者：王琦[1] 吴冲[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学管理学院

出　　处：《北京航空航天大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第6期80-85,共6页Journal of Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics：Social Sciences edition Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271070);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-08-0171)

摘　　要：以2009—2011年民营上市公司为样本,从大股东的视角来实证研究高管薪酬与公司绩效的关系,并探究大股东控制在高管薪酬激励效果中的协同效应和壕堑效应。研究发现:内部高管比例越大,高管薪酬对公司绩效的影响越小;大股东持股比例越大,高管薪酬对公司绩效的影响越大。大股东控制与高管薪酬激励效果的关系密切,这说明在高管薪酬激励效果中大股东控制确实具有协同效应和壕堑效应。This paper researches the relation between executive compensation and corporate performance from the per- spective of large shareholder by taking 2009--2011 private listed companies as the sample, then studies the incentive effect and entrenchment effect of large shareholder control on the incentive effects of executive compensation. Our re- suits show that the greater the proportion of internal executives, the smaller the impact of executive compensation to corporate performance; the larger the largest shareholding ratio, the greater the impact of executive compensation to corporate performance. Further we found that the large shareholder control relates with the incentive effects of execu- tive compensation, and has the incentive effect and entrenchment effect.

关 键 词：大股东控制 高管薪酬 公司绩效 民营上市公司 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]