当代伦理学关于运气问题的争论与辩护  

Arguments and Defenses about Moral Luck in Contemporary Ethics

作　　者：李义天 

机构地区：[1]中央编译局中国现实问题研究中心,副研究员北京100032

出　　处：《学术月刊》2014年第1期70-79,共10页Academic Monthly

基　　金：2010年国家社科基金项目"当代美德伦理学及其心理基础研究"(10CZX043)的阶段性成果

摘　　要："运气有多重要"一直是引起伦理学诸多争议的重要话题。围绕应该如何理解运气的伦理意义与道德权重,伦理学史上存在宏观与微观两种讨论方式。20世纪70年代以来,在微观层面上探讨运气与能动性、后果之间关系,以及三者对于道德评价的重要性,已成为当代伦理学的一个争论热点。以威廉姆斯为代表的运气论者主张,应承认运气的真实性和扰动作用,反对将道德评价局限于纯粹的能动性中。对此,后果论、温和的动机论与激进的动机论三种反对立场从各自角度出发,提出了相对应的反驳意见。它们的根本分歧在于,面对"能动性一运气一后果"的道德结构,四者把其中的不同因素理解为最重要的(或唯一重要的)评价根据。但是,反对者为了保持理论的融贯性,忽视甚至阉割了真实的道德经验。与之相比,引入并承认运气的重要性,是对人类有限性与世界复杂性的确认,促使我们重新思考道德知识与道德生活的本质。Abstract： ＂What dose luck matter＂ has been always an important issue debates in ethics. As to how to understand the ethical meanings and moral weight of luck, there are two ways in the history of ethics, macroscopic and microscopic. Since 1970＇s, the discussions about the relationship between luck and agency or consequence and the relevance of these three factors for moral appraisals, have been one of the focuses in contemporary ethics. Those who accept the conception of luck in ethics, such Bernard Williams, agree that we should recognize the reality and functions of luck and oppose to limit moral appraisals within the scope of pure agency. However, there are three oppositions of consequentialism, moderate motivism and radical motivism, showing their corresponding objections. The essential disagreement is that the four positions, with the moral structure of ＂agency-- luck--consequece＂, separately take different factors as the most （or even only ） important ground for appraisals. But the oppositions actually ignore and dismiss the real moral experience just for theoretical consistency. Compared with them, the position of introducing luck and recognizing its importance should be considered as confirming the limitation of human beings and the complexity of our world, and helping us to reflect essences of moral knowledge and moral life.

关 键 词：运气 能动性 后果 道德评价 

分 类 号：B82[哲学宗教—伦理学]