供应链中分享真实信息的激励机制  

Incentive mechanism for information truth-telling in supply chain

作　　者：晏国菀[1] 田盈[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆师范大学数学学院,重庆400047

出　　处：《控制与决策》2014年第1期113-117,共5页Control and Decision

摘　　要：展示了古诺竞争模型中一个供应商和多个零售商的3阶段博弈模型,并证实了如果零售商能真实地分享预测信息,则供应商往往会获利,而零售商的利润将下降.分享信息时零售商会有动机透露较少的需求预测,这种信息失真现象是各方利用私人信息获取自身利益的结果.如果供应商和零售商分享信息前,能够就相对利润率或利润达成协议,则信息共享的阻碍因素和扭曲信息的动机会消失,零售商将如实地分享信息,双方都能够从信息共享的行为中获利.A three-stages game model between one manufacture and retailers is presented which engages in Cournot competition. If the retailers share their forecasts truthfully, the manufacturer always benefits, but the profits of the retailers always worse off by disclosing their demand information to the manufacturer. However, the retailers have an incentive to understate their forecasts while sharing information. The information distortion phenomenon is the direct result of each party exploiting its private information to appropriate the gains from information sharing. If the manufacturer and the retailers can agree on their relative profit margins or profits prior to information sharing, the retailers will share their information truthfully and both parties may benefit from information sharing.

关 键 词：信息分享 供应链 古诺竞争 激励机制 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理]