信贷风险控制中的显性与隐性激励机制分析  

Analysis of Explicit and Implicit Incentive Mechanism for Controlling the Credit Risk

作　　者：程鹏[1] 吴冲峰[1] 李为冰[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《预测》2001年第1期58-60,共3页Forecasting

摘　　要：信贷过程中存在贷款人与借款人之间的信息不对称 ,从而导致信贷过程中出现道德风险。道德风险是信贷风险产生的根源。银行实际操作中 ,显性与隐性激励机制的存在可以减少信贷风险。本文通过建立防范道德风险的激励模型和企业声誉模型 。There is the asymmetric information between the creditor and debtor in the process of borrowing or lending m oney,which leads to the moral hazard.Moral hazard is the cause of credit risk.In the practice of bank,the existence of explicit and implicit incentive mechanism reduces the credit risk. This paper establishes the incentive model of guarding moral hazard and the reputation model of firm ,then analysis the roles of explicit and implicit incentive mechanism for controlling the credit risk.

关 键 词：信贷风险 显性激励 隐性激励 声誉模型 风险控制 激励机制 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]