义务教育教师绩效工资政策执行困境及其突破  

On the Dilemma of Policy Implementation of Performance-related Pay of Compulsory Education Teachers

作　　者：李根[1] 葛新斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学教育科学学院,广州510631

出　　处：《教育发展研究》2014年第4期41-46,共6页Research in Educational Development

摘　　要：自2008年中央出台"绩效工资"政策至今已逾六载,但义务教育学校教师绩效工资政策的执行效果却不容乐观。可以说,义务教育学校教师绩效工资政策的执行情况内化于中央政府逻辑、地方政府逻辑与义务教育学校逻辑的互动过程。不同的行动主体采取不同态度、行动和策略对特定政策加以"阐发"和"运作"是绩效工资政策执行困境形成的根源。为此,优化绩效工资政策的顶层设计、强化省级政府的统筹职责、构筑全方位的权力监控机制,应是消解义务教育学校教师绩效工资困境的可行之道。Although the Central Government carried out performance-related pay of Compulsory Education teachers at the year of 2008, this policy has not yet achieved its expected goals. The policy implementation of performance-related pay of Compulsory Education teachers is subjected to the multiple system logic featuring the interactive process between central government,local governments and county Compulsory Education schools. Different policy actors from different system fields tend to adopt different attitudes, behaviors and tactics to explain and implement specific policies, which shapes the dilemmas for performance-related pay of Compulsory Education teachers. In order to figure out the dilemma, it is imperative to optimize core contents of performance-related pay of Compulsory Education teachers, to strengthen the overall responsibility of the government at the provincial level and construct multi-dimensional monitoring system of power.

关 键 词：义务教育学校 绩效工资 政策执行 多重制度逻辑 政府间博弈 

分 类 号：G637[文化科学—教育学]