基于演化博弈的企业员工跳槽行为探析  

The Staff of Evolutionary Game Analysis Based on the Enterprise Job Hopping Behaviour

作　　者：华欢[1] 毛军权[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093 [2]上海行政学院现代人力资源测评研究中心,上海200233

出　　处：《江苏商论》2014年第1期72-74,85,共4页Jiangsu Commercial Forum

摘　　要：企业员工的跳槽会使企业遭受巨大损失,本文借鉴演化博弈论分析企业与员工跳槽行为之间的博弈关系,构建企业与员工之间的演化博弈模型,分析企业和员工两个群体策略选择的演变趋势。研究发现,员工是否选择"跳槽",与员工当前的工资收益、跳槽所获得的收益、企业实施监管所付出的成本、企业为了留住员工所实行的激励支出、企业对违约跳槽员工实施的罚款等参数相关。在此基础上,本文提出企业想要减少员工跳槽行为,可以从完善企业内部管理机制、加强与员工的信息沟通、积极建立良好企业文化三个方面采取措施。Enterprises suffer huge losses from employee turnover behavior, this article referred to the evolu- tionary game theory to analyze the game between the enterprise and employee turnover behavior. It built an evo- lutionary game model between the enterprise and its employees, and then analyzed the evolution trend of the strategic choices of the two groups of enterprises and employees. The study found that whether the staffs jump ship or not has a relationship with several parameters such as current wage gains, benefits and fine if jumping, the regulatory cost that enterprises have to pay , incentive spending in order to retain staff and so on . On this basis, we propose that the companies can take steps from three aspects such as improve the internal management mechanism, strengthen communication with employees, and actively establish a good corporate culture in order to reduce employee turnover behavior.

关 键 词：员工跳槽行为 演化博弈 趋势分析 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]