资产专用性与国有企业用工制度分析  

The Analysis on the Asset Specificity and the Employment Institution of the State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：年志远[1] 刘斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学中国国有经济研究中心

出　　处：《清华大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2014年第2期134-139,161,共6页Journal of Tsinghua University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目资助(11JJD790039);吉林大学“985工程”项目资助;吉林省软科学研究项目(20120608)

摘　　要：改革开放后,国有企业用工制度由计划单轨制,逐步过渡到计划与市场并存的双轨制。双轨制虽然提高了国有企业用工效率,但是,也存在一些问题,其突出表现是同工不同酬、人才流失和人浮于事等。国有企业用工制度产生了高昂的交易成本。国有企业用工制度存在问题的实质,是契约不完全。资产专用性作为交易成本的重要维度,对机会主义行为有双重影响,直接关系到用工双方的博弈类型及结果,因此,以资产专用性为分析工具来探索国有企业用工制度存在的问题及对策具有重要的意义。After the reform and opening-up policies,the employment institution of the state-owned enterprises has gradually changed from the single track of planned economy to the double track system including planned and market economy.While the double track system improves the labor efficiency of the state-owned enterprises,however,there are also some problems,showing mainly in the pattern of unequal pay for equal work,brain drain and bloated bureaucracy.The transaction costs of the employment institution of the state-owned enterprises are very high.The essence of the problem is the incomplete contract.The asset specificity is not only an important dimension of the transaction cost,but also has a double effect on the opportunistic behavior,meanwhile the asset specificity is directly related to the type of game and the results of the labor and the management.Therefore,it is important to use the tool of the asset specificity to analyze the problems and countermeasures of the employment institution of the state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：资产专用性 国有企业 用工制度 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F249.2[经济管理—国民经济] F123.7