契约治理机制与渠道投机行为:关系营销导向的作用  

Contractual Governance Mechanism and Channel Opportunism: The Role of Relationship Marketing Orientation

作　　者：张闯[1] 张双俐[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学工商管理学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2014年第2期58-65,共8页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"企业及其边界人员角色导向对营销渠道治理机制及其结果的影响:基于角色理论的多层面研究"(71202038);教育部人文社会科学研究项目"社会网络嵌入对营销渠道控制及其结果的影响"(10YJA630200);中国博士后科学基金特别资助项目"社会网络嵌入对营销渠道控制行为的影响研究"(201104626)

摘　　要：文章基于关系营销理论和渠道治理理论,建构了关系营销导向、契约治理机制对渠道投机行为影响的概念模型,并通过对来自制造商的278个样本的数据分析,检验了三者之间的影响关系。实证研究结果表明:在中国营销渠道中,企业的关系营销导向对其采用契约治理机制有显著促进作用;契约治理机制对渠道伙伴的投机行为有显著抑制作用;企业的关系营销导向能够显著抑制渠道伙伴针对己方的投机行为。文章对研究发现进行了讨论并指出了未来的研究方向。Based on the relationship marketing theory and the channel behavior theory, we build a conceptual model of relationship marketing orientation, contractual governance mechanism and channel opportunism behaviors in marketing channels. Based on the analysis of 278 samples from the manufacturers, we examine the model empirically. The results show that in the Chinese marketing channels, firm＇s relationship marketing orientation has positive effects on the contractual governance mechanism; the contractual governance mechanism has negative effect on the channel partners＇ opportunism behaviors; the relationship marketing orientation can significantly inhibit the channel partner＇s opportunism. The conclusions are discussed and the future research directions are pointed out.

关 键 词：渠道治理 关系营销导向 契约治理 渠道投机行为 

分 类 号：F713.50[经济管理—市场营销]