政府补助、软约束与薪酬差距  

Subsidy,Soft Constraint and Pay Gap

作　　者：步丹璐[1] 王晓艳[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2014年第2期23-33,共11页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71002111);国家社会科学基金项目(13BJY015)资助

摘　　要：本文以政府补助为切入点,以2007-2010年中国A股上市公司的5118个样本为研究对象,通过分析约束性不同的政府补助对薪酬差距及其激励效应的影响,检验了高管权力通过政府补助作用于薪酬差距的具体过程。本文研究发现:(1)高管权力的存在会使政府补助成为其"伪装"业绩的指标,从而增加高管薪酬,进而加大公司内部的薪酬差距。并且这种现象在国有企业中比在民营企业中表现得更为突出;(2)高管利用政府补助增加其薪酬的权力受制于政府补助的约束性。仅在政府补助约束性较弱的情况下,政府补助才会增加高管薪酬,加大薪酬差距;(3)从政府补助影响薪酬差距的经济后果来看,政府补助导致的薪酬差距会削弱薪酬差距对公司未来业绩的正向影响。同时,软约束补助对薪酬差距激励效应的削弱作用更大。By exploring the special institution background of subsi- dy in China and using 5118 Chinese listed companies＇ observations from 2007 to 2010, this article analyzes how the subsidy with different constraints affects the pay gap between executives and employees and explains the positive relation between subsidy and pay gap using managerial power theory. According to the managerial power theory, the executives can ＂disguise＂ the accounting performance by the government subsidy, as the executive compensation is based on the accounting performance, the subsidy which is recorded in gains as part of net income will increase the executive compensation and create a larger intra-company pay gap. The positive relationship be- tween subsidy and pay gap is more significant in the State-Owned Enterprises than that of private enterprises, and is most prominent in the State-Owned enterprises owed by local government, which indicates that executives in the State-Owned enterprises have more power to let subsidy increase their compensation and especially the executives in local government controlled State-Owned enterprises. We further check the subsidy with different constraints by using hand collected data, we find that the positive relationship between subsidy and pay gap only exit when subsidy is with soft constraints, and no significant relation between subsidy with hard constraints and pay gap, which shows that the power of the executives to in- crease their compensation by using government subsidy is con- strained by the government subsidy＇s constraints and supervisions. Finally, we check the economic consequence of government sub- sidy＇s effect on the pay gap and we find that the pay gap generated by the government subsidy will write off the pay gap＇s tournament effect, that is to say, it weakens the pay gap＇s positive incentive influence on the company＇s future performance. The weakening ef- fect is bigger when the subsidy is with fewer constraints. By testing the relationship between subsidy and pay gap, w

关 键 词：软约束补助 高管薪酬 薪酬差距 高管权力 锦标赛效应 

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