企业成长的控制权约束──对企业家控制的企业的研究  

The Constraint of Residual Control Rights to the Growth of Firms: A Study on the Entrepreneur-Controlled-Firms

作　　者：李新春[1] 胡骥 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院 [2]洛阳玻璃集团公司

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2000年第3期18-23,共6页Nankai Business Review

摘　　要：企业成长的管理约束反应为彭罗斯效应中吸纳与集成新管理能力的问题，而在企业家控制的企业，则更多的表现为受到企业家个人经营能力和控制幅度的制约。与此密切相关的问题是，企业剩余控制权的分配如可影响企业的成长？对这一问题的分析有必要区分分散化的（公众公司）和集中化的（所有者控制的企业）所有权结构。本文在此基础上分析了所谓企业家“控制权回报”与企业成长的关系，并进而研究企业在走向制度化和控制权转移（接班人）问题对企业长期稳定发展的影响。By the Penrose's Effect is the managerial constraint of the growth of firms a function of the adaptation and integration of new managerial service. But in the entrepreneur-controlled-firms (ECFs) the growth process is more affected by the managerial capabilities and the span of the control of the entrepreneur himself as owner. And the related key problem is, how the allocation of the residual control rights of the firm affects the growth of the firm.For ECFs we analyze specially the relationship between the 'return of control right'and the growth of the firm. In this paper we give also a further study on the constraint effects by the transfer of control rights and in the changing process from EFC to modern hierarchical governancein China

关 键 词：企业成长 控制权 企业家 彭罗斯效应 

分 类 号：F272.9[经济管理—企业管理]