规范国有控股公司董事行为问题初探  

A Preliminary Discussion on Control of Behavior of Directors in State-Owned Holding Companies

作　　者：齐勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京行政学院政治经济学教研部,北京100044

出　　处：《北京行政学院学报》2000年第6期32-34,共3页Journal of Beijing administration institute

摘　　要：当前在国有企业公司制改造过程中存在着作为国有股权代表的董事行为失范问题。本文认为这些问题应从以下三个方面采取措施加以解决 ,即 :降低国有股比重 ,构造公司股权多元化结构 ;改变股份制企业经营管理者由政府任命的状况 ,还董事会以聘任和解聘公司经理人员的职权 ;加强对作为国有股权代表的董事的激励与约束机制。The current course of transforming SOEs into corporations is accompanied by the behavior deviation of the directors who function as representatives of state-owned stock. This paper proposes three measures to solve such a problem. They are: reducing the share of state-owned stock and diversifying the composition of corporation stock, changing the practice of appointing stock company managers by government and entitling the board of directors to engage and dismiss managers, and strengthening the mechanism of inspiring and restraining the directors who are representatives of state-owned stock.

关 键 词：中国 国有股权 董事 公司 国有控股公司 激励机制 约束机制 

分 类 号：F279.246[经济管理—企业管理] F279.21[经济管理—国民经济]