股权激励契约设计与公司盈余管理行为  

The Design of Equity Incentive Contract and Earnings Management Behavior of Listed Companies

作　　者：马娟[1,2] 万解秋[1] 

机构地区：[1]苏州大学商学院,江苏苏州215006 [2]南通大学商学院,江苏南通226019

出　　处：《南通大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第3期128-134,共7页Journal of Nantong University:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(11YJC630176);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究资助项目(2013SJB790046);南通市社会科学基金项目(2013CNT0021)

摘　　要：以2006年公告股权激励方案的上市公司为研究对象,运用其股权激励方案公告后3年的相关数据,基于应计项目与线下项目盈余管理的双重计量视角,实证分析股权激励契约的设计对激励后公司盈余管理方式与强度的影响。研究发现:股权激励方案公告后,相关公司应计项目和线下项目的盈余管理都存在,且公司管理层倾向于实施应计项目盈余管理方式。相对于实施业绩股票模式的公司,实施股票期权模式公司的线下项目盈余管理会显著减少,而应计项目盈余管理减少不明显。激励规模越大,行权条件设计的越严格,无论是应计项目还是线下项目盈余管理均会增强。激励计划的有效期设计的越长,线下项目盈余管理会显著减少,应计项目盈余管理减少不明显。This essay takes companies which made public their equity incentive contract in 2006 as subject, collects relevant data in the successive three years, and empirically analyzes the influence of the dequity incentive contract on the methods and profoundness of the control of earnings The research reveals that, after the publication of equity incentive contract, control of earnings is conducted for both accruals and below-the-lines, and the executives tend to exert control of earnings on accruals. Compared with companies which employ performance shares mode, companies which employ the stock option mode show significant reduction in the control of earnings of below-the-lines, while there is no significant re-duction in the control of earnings for accruals. The larger the scale of incentive is, the more stern the control of earnings for accruals and below-the-lines will be.

关 键 词：股权激励方案 契约要素 应计项目盈余管理 线下项目盈余管理 

分 类 号：F279.246[经济管理—企业管理]