经理人治理理论模型:述评与展望  

A Review of Theoretical Models about Manager Governance

作　　者：袁春生[1] 吴丽丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西师范大学财政金融学院,江西南昌330022

出　　处：《金融教育研究》2014年第3期51-56,共6页Research of Finance and Education

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"民营上市公司外聘高管的代理成本与激励机制效果:基于经理人市场视角"(71262025);国家社会科学基金项目"非正式制度对我国会计准则执行的影响研究"(12BJY015)

摘　　要：近几十年来完善公司治理以减少经理人代理成本的研究得到了蓬勃发展,其中一个分支是经理人治理研究。经理人治理作用受到学术界广泛关注,并取得了丰富的研究成果,为经理人市场变迁的相关经济现象提供了颇具竞争性的理论解释。文章在系统梳理相关文献的基础上,对经理人激励、经理人能力的学习、管理才能配置等理论模型进行简要介绍与评述,最后进一步展望此领域的未来研究方向。For some decades researches of improving corporate governance by reducing agency cost of managers are booming,and the research of manager governance mechanism is a branch. The role of manager governance has been paid great attention by academe,and many competitive theories have been made to explain the related econom-ic phenomena of manager from the angle of labor market change. This paper briefly reviewed the theoretical models of incentive,learning ability,and administrative ability for managers,and the future researches of manager govern-ance was discussed and developed.

关 键 词：激励模型 学习模型 经理人权力 管理才能配置 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]