委托代理与国有企业经营者行为模式构建  

The Principal-agent Theory and Construction of the Behavior Model of Managers in the State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：吴昌南[1] 

机构地区：[1]韶关学院旅游系,广东韶关512005

出　　处：《韶关大学学报》2001年第2期11-15,共5页

摘　　要：文章运用委托代理理论分析了国有企业与西方股份公司经营者行为差异 ,指出国有企业经营者激励与约束行为存在的主要问题是 :激励与约束的客体模糊、激励不相容和风险责任不对称等 ,并提出构建我国国有企业经营者激励与约束行为的有效模式应从两方面着手 :一是逐步创造公平竞争的市场环境 ,建立间接的激励与约束机制 ;Based on the analysis of the different behavior model of managers between Western joint stock companies and state owned enterprises,the author points out some problems,i.e.,objective obscurity of incentives and constraints,asymmetry of hazard and responsibility etc.existing in the state owned enterprises.To solve these problems we should construct a efficient behavior model of managers of the state owned enterprises from two sides;one is to construct a direct system of incentives and constraints;while the other is the indirect.

关 键 词：委托代理 经营者行为模式 约束机制 国有企业 激励机制 

分 类 号：F279.241[经济管理—企业管理]