“逆向选择”下的个人人力资本投资  

Individual Human Capital Investment Under the Situation of Adverse Selection

作　　者：胡永远[1] 李少斌[2] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学经济系,福建厦门361005 [2]厦门大学计统系,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《人口与经济》2001年第6期48-54,共7页Population & Economics

摘　　要：在中国高等教育实行收费制、高校毕业生就业率下降的条件下 ,为什么居民的高等教育投资需求还是这么强劲 ?本文用一个“逆向选择”下人力资本投资的博弈假说解释了上述现象。本文的基本结论是 ,在劳动力岗位实行竞争性配置、教育筛选机制不规范的前提下 ,人力资本的创造性替代导致了低能者的防御性反应 ,从而出现人力资本市场的“逆向选择” ;而“逆向选择”With self\|payment of university education and the decline of employmen trate for the people with university education, it is surprised to see that individuals' demand of university education investment remains very strong. This paper explained the above question by using game theory of human capital investment urder the situation of adverse selection. This paper ends with the conclusion that creative substitutions of human capital have given rise to lemons' defending reacts and adverse selection in the human capital market, which in turn causes further excessive investment in individual human capital.

关 键 词：人力资本投资 逆向选择 序贯博弈 中国 高等教育 劳动力市场 

分 类 号：G649.2[文化科学—高等教育学] F249.21[文化科学—教育学]