内部控制影响企业创新投入吗?——基于管理者自利行为视角  

Does Internal Control Affect the Investment of Enterprise Innovation?——Based on the Self-interest Behavior of Managers

作　　者：赵莹 刘西国 刘晓慧 ZHAO Ying;LIU Xiguo;LIU Xiaohui(Business School,University of Jinan ,Jinan,Shandong 250000,China)

机构地区：[1]济南大学商学院,中国济南250000

出　　处：《上海商学院学报》2018年第6期13-18,共6页Business Economic Review

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目"幸福老龄化导向下的社会保障与代际转移联动机制研究"(17YJAZH054)

摘　　要：文章以2013—2016年我国A股1205家上市公司为样本,以管理者自利行为为切入点,研究了内部控制对企业创新的影响,并分析管理者自利行为在这一过程中充当的角色。结果显示,完善的内部控制能够促进企业创新投入水平,同时内部控制通过约束管理者自利行为进一步促进创新投入。文章进一步提出了企业业绩与高管薪酬挂钩制度、在职消费预算制度等措施约束管理者自利行为,推动企业开展技术创新。Based on the sample of 1,205 A-share companies in China from2013 to 2016,this paper studies the impact of internal control on enterprise innovation from the self-interest behavior of managers,and analyzes the role of the self-interest behavior of managers in the middle of this process.The results show that perfect internal control can promote the level of innovation investment.Meanwhile it further promotes innovation investment by constraining self-interest behavior of managers.This paper proposes measures such as the linkage between business performance and executive compensation,and the on-the-job consumption budget system to restrict the self-interest behavior of managers and further promote enterprise innovation.

关 键 词：内部控制 创新投入 管理者自利 中介效应 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]