针对国内双寡头的最优R&D补贴策略  

Optimal R&D subsidy policy to domestic duopoly

作　　者：霍沛军[1] 陈继祥[2] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084 [2]上海交通大学工商管理系,上海200052

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2002年第2期115-120,166,共7页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目 ( 70 0 710 16 )

摘　　要：考虑政府针对国内双寡头企业的最优 R& D补贴策略 .在政府选择 R& D补贴率后 ,每个企业先后确定自己的 R& D支出和产量 .根据双寡头在 R& D阶段和生产阶段是否合作 ,给出了完全不合作、半合作和完全合作 3种情况下政府的最优 R& D补贴率 .研究表明 ,在每种情况下政府均选择正的补贴率 .完全不合作时的补贴率大于 (等于、小于 )半合作时的补贴率 ,当且仅当完全不合作时的 R& D水平小于 (等于、大于 )半合作时的 R& D水平 .但在完全合作时的 R& D水平小于完全不合作时 ,完全合作时的补贴率有可能比完全不合作时小 ,这与直觉是相悖的 .产生这种现象的原因是 R& D水平增加相同数量后 。This paper derives a government's optimal R&D subsidy policy to a domestic duopoly. Each firm determines its R&D expenditure and output successively after the government chooses the R&D subsidy rate. According to whether the duopoly cooperates in R&D and output stage, this paper gives the government's optimal R&D subsidy rate under three different cases which are full noncooperation, mixed cooperation and pure cooperation, respectively. The subsidy rate under fully noncooperative case is larger than (equal to, smaller than) that under mixed case if and only if the R&D level under full noncooperation is smaller than (equal to, larger than) that under mixed game. However, the subsidy rate under pure cooperation may be smaller than that under full noncooperation when the R&D level under pure cooperation is smaller than that under full noncooperation, which contradicts common sense. The reason for such a contradiction is that the increment of the social welfare under pure cooperation is smaller than that under full noncooperation and mixed game if there is an increment to the R&D level.

关 键 词：合作 COURNOT均衡 NASH均衡 最优R&D补贴策略 双寡头企业 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]