非对称信息条件下降低成本的策略  

The Strategy of Reducing Production Costs under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：张晓鸥[1] 李丽君[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《东北大学学报（社会科学版）》2002年第3期187-189,共3页Journal of Northeastern University(Social Science)

摘　　要：探讨了在非对称信息条件下 ,生产管理者如何激励生产者努力降低成本的问题。运用委托代理理论分析 ,并指出了激励的必要性。构建了委托代理框架下的模型 。The thesis deals with the problem about how to induce producers to reduce production costs for managers under asymmetric information. The principal agent theory is applied to indicate the importance of inducement. The author establishes the model based on the principal agent theory to show how to determine the sharing cost underrun on condition that manager and producer get the biggest profit respectively.

关 键 词：非对称信息 道德风险 委托代理理论 成本 企业 生产者 管理者 目标 函数 

分 类 号：F275.3[经济管理—企业管理]