意向性:从立义到意向流形  

Intentionality: From Apprehension to Intentional Manifold

作　　者：马迎辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学哲学系

出　　处：《安徽大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2015年第6期36-43,共8页Journal of Anhui University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(12CZX048)

摘　　要：种属上的规定性、存在的现成性、意向体验与反思的实显性,这三者共同构成现象学的立义模式的限度。在内时间意识研究中,通过对同时性困境的消除以及对体验流的内在结构的发现,胡塞尔将立义行为的基础揭示为能思—所思的意向流形。这一新的意向结构不仅体现了形式存在论的先天性,在此意义上使超越论现象学具有了一元论的特征,而且通过其自身的平行性,展示了绝对存在的内在的多维奠基结构。现象学运动由此获得了新的基础和起点。The determination of genus and the objective presence of things,together with the real appearance of intentional experience and reflection,these three constitute the limits of the phenomenological apprehension model. In the investigation of the consciousness of inner time,Husserl revealed the foundation of the apprehend act as the intentional manifold of noesis- noema by the elimination of the plight of simultaneousness and the discovery of the inner structure of the stream of experience. This new intentional structure not only reflects the apriority of the form ontology,which characterizes transcendentalism phenomenology by monism,but also shows the inner and multidimensional foundation structure of absolute existence through its own parallelism. Thus the movement of phenomenology gets new foundation and beginning.

关 键 词：立义 同时性 形式存在论 能思 所思 

分 类 号：B516.52[哲学宗教—外国哲学]