“明示”与“默示”——康德与早期维特根斯坦的不同“划界”  

In silence or not——The difference between Kant and Wittgenstein in drawing the limit of the knowledge

作　　者：孙江可[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学哲学社会学院,吉林长春130012 [2]西安电子科技大学人文学院,陕西西安710071

出　　处：《中南大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第4期170-173,共4页Journal of Central South University：Social Sciences

基　　金：2012年中央高校基本业务费一般项目"维特根斯坦早期哲学逻辑基础的分析及对二语习得的关系"(72125345)

摘　　要：康德的《纯粹理性批判》和维特根斯坦的《逻辑哲学论》均以划界为首要任务。康德的划界是明示的、外在的,而维特根斯坦的划界是默示的、内在的。这种差异根源于二者不同的逻辑方法。康德的先验逻辑既关涉形式,又关涉内容,所以在界限之外也有所说;而维特根斯坦的数理逻辑只关涉形式,所以惟有沉默。Kant wants to draw a limit of knowledge in the book《Critique of Pure reason》;Wittgenstein wants to draw a limit of knowledge in the book《Tractatus》too. Kant tells us clearly that what we can know and we can＆#39;t get any reliable knowledge if we pass the limit of knowledge;Wittgenstein tells that what we can say at all can be said clearly, and we must pass over in silence what we can’t talk about. Kant can express both sides of the limit of the knowledge, but Wittgenstein only draws one side of the limit：what we can say can be said clearly, while the other side we must keep silence. Why is Wittgenstein so different from Kant in drawing the limit of the knowledge？ Because they have different logical tools it their books. Kant’s transcendental logic pays attention not only to the logical form but also to the content, while Wittgenstein only pays attention to the logical form.

关 键 词：康德 维特根斯坦 划界 先验逻辑 逻辑型式 明示 默示 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学]