不完全信息下的供应链激励模型研究  

Study on Supply Chain Motivation Model with Incomplete Information

作　　者：杜晔[1] 谢铁军[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学数理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《物流技术》2014年第8期346-348,359,共4页Logistics Technology

摘　　要：由单个零售商和单个供应商组成的二级供应链,零售商对供应商的批发价格具有一定的压价能力,在完全信息零售商与供应商的stackelberg博弈基础上,研究了零售商将压价率作为私有信息的不完全信息博弈的激励机制问题。供应商利用激励机制能够使零售商真实披露隐瞒的信息,从而实现系统收益最大化。最后,运用实例仿真验证了激励机制的可行性,说明激励机制设计实现了供应链整体绩效的改进。In this paper, on the basis of the Stackelberg game between the retailers and suppliers under complete information, we studied the motivation mechanism of the supply chain composed by the two where the retailers held the bargain rate as private information, by which the suppliers could encourage the retailers to disclose the information, thus maximizing the benefit of the supply chain, and at the end, demonstrated the feasibility of the motivation mechanism through a simulation.

关 键 词：不完全信息 供应链 博弈 激励机制 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]