高管薪酬激励会导致银行过度冒险吗?——来自中国房地产信贷市场的证据  

Does Executive Compensation Promote Bankers'Excessive Risk Taking?Evidence from Chinese Real Estate Lending Market

作　　者：洪正[1] 申宇[2] 吴玮 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学中国金融研究中心 [2]西南财经大学金融学院 [3]上饶银行

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2014年第3期1585-1614,共30页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目"金融分权与地方金融管理体制研究"(13BJY168);国家社会科学基金重大项目"防范系统性和区域性金融风险研究--基于金融适度分权的视角"(13&ZD030);自然科学基金青年项目"我国校友关系网络研究"(71303054);西南财经大学"211工程"项目;中国博士后项目(2013M531090)资助

摘　　要：本文以我国房地产信贷市场为例,实证检验了银行高管薪酬激励与房地产信贷风险之间的联系。结果表明,总体上银行高管薪酬与房地产信贷风险呈现显著正相关,进一步的研究还发现两者之间存在倒U形关系,即高管薪酬开始增加时银行有较强的冒险动机,房贷增速加快,当超过某一临界值时薪酬继续提高,银行将趋于保守,房贷增速降低。而且不同类型银行间具有明显差异,平均而言,提高高管薪酬使得城市和农村商业银行更容易冒险,而国有和股份制银行则更可能变得谨慎。In this paper, through empirically testing the relationship between China＇s bank executive compensation and real estate lending, we find that real estate lending is positively related with bank executive compensation; furthermore the relationship is inverse ＂U＂ shaped. When executive compensation begins to increase, bankers take excessive risk by extending more real estate lending, after the threshold, bankers become conservative to reduce the credit. We also show that increased compensation generally promotes risk taking for city and rural banks, while prevents such action for national banks. The results have several implications for financial executive compensation reform.

关 键 词：高管薪酬激励 银行过度冒险 房地产信贷 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F832.45[经济管理—国民经济]