黑格尔逻辑学中否定的自关联  

Die Selbstbeziehung der Negation in Hegels Logik

作　　者：A.F.科赫 谢裕伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]德国海德堡大学哲学系

出　　处：《世界哲学》2014年第6期26-42,共17页World Philosophy

摘　　要：在黑格尔逻辑学中,否定以多种形态出现,其中最值得关注的是自关联的否定。对集合论中的自反单元集以及说谎者悖论的分析表明,自关联的否定不仅出现在黑格尔逻辑学之中,而且一直运行在我们的推论性思想中。不过在黑格尔逻辑学中,否定一开始还不是自关联的,而是后一个事态片面地否定前一个事态。在定在逻辑的"它自己的它物"中否定才第一次以自关联的形态出现。但在整个存在逻辑中,否定始终保持着与直接存在的牵连,因而只是在弱的意义上是自关联的无基否定。直到在本质逻辑中,在同一性与区分的相互映现中,否定才展示为绝对的和自律的否定。Negation appears in various forms in Hegel's logic,among which the self-referred negation is worth paying more attention to.The analysis of self-singleton and Liar's Paradox proves that the self-referred negation not only appears outside Hegel's logic,but also operates in our discursive thinking from the beginning.However,the negation at the outset of Hegel's logic is not yet self-referred,but of a former state of affair by a later one.The negation appears as self-referred at the first time at 'the other of itself' in the logic of Dasein.But it remains confused with the immediate being in the whole logic of being,therefore self-referred only in the meaning of a weak unfoundedness.It proves to be absolutely and autonomically self-referred until it operates at the shine of identity and difference into each other in the logic of essence.

关 键 词：说谎者悖论 无基性 它自己的它物 映象 

分 类 号：B516.35[哲学宗教—外国哲学]