新形势下中国地方官员的治理效应研究  

The Governance Effects of Local Officials in China

作　　者：皮建才[1] 殷军[1] 周愚[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学经济学院,邮政编码210093 [2]日本大阪大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济研究》2014年第10期89-101,共13页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"中国转型时期地方官员治理研究"(项目批准号:12YJCZH165);2012年度教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"项目的资助

摘　　要：本文通过建立税收竞争模型对我国地方官员的治理效应进行了研究。文中考察了两种治理手段,一种是中央政府降低晋升激励强度,另一种是中央政府提高反在职消费强度,并对其治理效应进行了分析。本文发现,当中央政府降低对地方官员的晋升激励强度时,地方官员会减少发展型公共物品供给、增加在职消费,而民生型公共物品供给则保持不变;当中央政府提高对地方官员的反在职消费强度时,地方官员会减少在职消费,增加发展型公共物品供给和民生型公共物品供给。当中央政府同时采取这两种治理手段时,两者的作用在一定程度上会相互抵消,具体对地方官员的治理效应如何,则取决于哪种政策措施的治理效应更强,但无论如何民生型公共物品供给一定会增加。本文还把环境污染引入了居民福利函数,结果发现,就不同治理手段对居民福利产生的影响而言,边际污染的临界水平发挥了非常重要的作用。This paper mainly analyzes the governance effects of local officials in China through constructing tax competition models. We consider two different governance measures of the central government, one is to reduce the intensity of political incentives, and the other is to enhance the strength of anti position-related consumption. We focus mainly on the governance effects of these two measures. When the intensity of political incentives is reduced by the central government, local officials will decrease the provision of development-oriented public goods and increase position-related consumption, but the provision of livelihood-oriented public goods will not be changed. When the strength of anti position-related consumption is enhanced by the central government, local officials will decrease position-related consumption and increase the provision of both development-oriented and livelihood-oriented public goods. When two measures are simultaneously adopted, the governance effects will be offset to some degree, and the eventual outcomes will depend on which effect dominates, however, the provision of livelihood-oriented public goods will be inevitably increased no matter which effect is stronger. We also introduce the environmental pollution into the residents＇ objective function, and find that the critical level of marginal pollution plays an important role in determining the governance effects on the residents＇ welfare.

关 键 词：中央政府 地方官员 政治晋升 在职消费 治理效应 

分 类 号：D630.3[政治法律—政治学]