我国上市公司高管在职消费:有效激励还是隐性腐败——基于市场化改革进程视角的理论分析框架  

Executive Perks of China's Listed Companies: Effective Incentive or Implicit Corruption——A Theoretical Analysis Framework Based on the Process of Marketization Reform

作　　者：谢获宝[1] 惠丽丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2014年第11期1-4,共4页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(10BGL067);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(10YJA790236);武汉大学博士研究生自主科硕项目(2013105010207)

摘　　要：文章在梳理现有文献的基础上,从外部制度环境动态变化的角度考察高管在职消费隐性薪酬契约的激励有效性,对高管在职消费的现状、成因及经济后果进行理论分析,并提出治理高管过度在职消费的相关措施。从而为深入研究在我国市场化改革进程中,企业高管在职消费薪酬契约的激励效果提供理论分析框架,为解决高管过度在职消费问题提供理论支持和措施建议。Based on review the existing researches,the paper makes a study on the effectiveness of incentive of executive perks implicit compensation contract from the perspective of the dynamic changes of the external institutional environment. It also car-ries out a theoretical analysis on the present situation,the causes and the economic consequences of executive perks,and puts forward relevant measures to control excessive perks. The paper provides a theoretical analysis framework for the further re-search on the effect of incentive of executive perks compensation contract in the process of China’s marketization reform,and also offers the theoretical support and measures to solve the problem of excessive perks.

关 键 词：在职消费 市场化改革 有效激励 隐性腐败 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]