控股股东所有权结构、产权性质与高管薪酬决定的掏空效应  

Ownership Structure of Controlling Shareholder,the Nature of Property Rights and the Tunneling Effects in the Determination of Executive Compensation

作　　者：黄再胜[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京政治学院上海校区,上海200433

出　　处：《湖北经济学院学报》2014年第6期60-67,共8页Journal of Hubei University of Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(2010CGL056)

摘　　要：本文基于股东间代理问题视角，利用2007~2011年我国A股上市公司数据，实证考察了高管薪酬的过度支付是否会成为控股股东实现控制权私利的一种路径。研究发现：在地方国企中，高管薪酬水平与控股股东的现金流权显著负相关，与控股股东控制权与现金流权的两权分离度显著正相关，但这一结论在央企和民营企业中均不成立。这表明地方国企高管薪酬决定存在明显的掏空效应。本文的研究结论对于深化国企高管薪酬管理制度改革具有政策启示涵义。From the Perspective of principal-principal agency problem, this paper empirically analyses whether there exist the tunneling effect in the determination of CEO compensation of Chinese Listed Companies. We find that there is a signifi-cant negative relationship between controlling shareholder＇s cash flow right and the level of CEO compensation, while the wedge between control right and cash flow right of controlling shareholder has a significant positive effect on the level of CEO compensation in local government controlled firms. But such relationships do not exit in both central government controlled firms and privately owned firms. These findings have policy implications for the reform of SOEs＇ executive compensation system.

关 键 词：股东间代理问题 高管薪酬 掏空效应 

分 类 号：F272.7[经济管理—企业管理]