动态资源论视角下管理者政治联系的价值——关于中国高管离职的实证研究  

Value of Top Managers' Political Ties from Dynamic Resource-based Theory: An Empirical Study on Top Managers' Turnover in China

作　　者：高照军[1] 韦夏[2] 孙轶[3] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工业大学经贸管理学院,杭州310023 [2]深圳大学管理学院,广东深圳518060 [3]中国五矿集团公司,北京100010

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2015年第1期171-180,共10页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

基　　金：浙江省哲学社会科学重点研究基地技术创新与企业国际化研究中心项目(12&ZD098);国家自然科学基金项目(71132002;71002002)

摘　　要：通过资源基础理论,从动态能力的视角,研究政治联系对管理者离职现象的影响,揭示了中国企业如何动态地、长期地运用政治资源。研究发现:首先,如果继任者具有政治联系,其前任高管更可能被解聘。但是,从长期看,随着政治资源被公司开发和利用,具有政治联系的高管将面临着更高的离职几率。其次,当具有政治联系的高管离职后,继任者往往也具有政治联系。最后,利用中国中小上市公司的数据,验证了研究的假设。This paper investigates the impact of political ties on top managers＇ turnover from a combination of re-source based view and dynamic capabilities. It uncovers how firms manage their political ties in the emerging mar-kets of China, from a dynamic perspective. The main findings are that, firstly, the incumbent manager faces a higher dismissal rate when his or her successor has political ties. However, in the long run, managers who have political ties encountered higher dismissal rates when their political ties had been fully exploited. Finally, after the dismissal of managers with political ties, the successor always is a person with political ties. Employing the data of small and middle size enterprises （SMEs） in the listed market of China, our hypotheses are supported.

关 键 词：资源理论 动态能力 政治联系 高管离职 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]