股权资本成本与高管薪酬激励——一个高管薪酬改革思路的理论性阐释  

Cost of Equity Capital and Executive Compensation Incentive:——A Theory of Executive Compensation Reform

作　　者：邹颖[1] 汪平[2] 

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院,北京100070 [2]山东财经大学公司财务研究中心,山东济南250014

出　　处：《经济与管理评论》2015年第1期41-48,共8页Review of Economy and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"资本成本约束;可持续分红与国有企业价值创造"(项目编号:11BGL026);北京市属高等学校高层次人才引进与培养计划项目之青年拔尖人才项目"基于资本成本锚定效应的公司财务政策优化研究"的阶段性成果

摘　　要：以会计绩效为基准的高管薪酬制度是当今的主流,广泛应用于国际企业界。然而越来越多的研究证据表明,高管薪酬与会计业绩之间的关系不足以成为建立高管薪酬制度的理论基础。唯有遵循股东至上原则的高管薪酬方案才能既满足管理层对于薪酬的预期,又有助于在可持续发展的前提下,实现股东财富最大化目标。股权资本成本是这种高管薪酬制度设计的基本因素与核心参数。Executive compensation system,based on the accounting performance,is the mainstream today and has been widely utilized worldwide.But more and more research evidence suggests that the relationship between executive compensation and accounting per-formance is insufficient to be the theoretical basis of executive compensation system.Therefore,this paper proposes that only when ex-ecutive compensation incentive schemes follows the principle of shareholder wealth supremacy can it not only meet the expectations of the executives on compensation,but also fulfill the goals of shareholder wealth maximization on the premise of the firm＇s sustainable development.Cost of equity capital is the basic factor and core parameter in the designing of executive compensation system.

关 键 词：股权资本成本 高管薪酬 股东财富 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]